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Guestworkers and Exploitation 
Robert Mayer 
Are guestworker programs exploitative? Egalitarian and neoclassical theories of 
exploitation agree that they always are. But these judgments are too indiscriminate. 
Privileged guests are the exception, and the exception points toward a more 
sensitive standard for identifying exploitation. This more sensitive standard, the 
sufficiency theory of exploitation, is used to analyze several guestworker programs. 
Even when guestworker programs are exploitative, it is argued that the unfairness 
should be tolerated if the exploitation is modest, not severe, and if the most likely 
nonexploitative alternative worsens the plight of the disadvantaged. 
On January 7, 2004, President George W. Bush proposed that 
the United States create a guestworker program as a way to channel 
the flow of illegal immigration into the country.1 Foreign workers 
and undocumented immigrants would be granted legal status on 
temporary visas to work in designated sectors of the economy where 
there is a domestic labor shortage. The visas would be renewable 
every three years but not indefinitely, and the guestworkers and any 
dependents they bring would not be eligible for many government 
benefits or set automatically on the path to naturalization. Like other 
host countries, the United States would be offering a trade-off to 
prospective guests: accept temporary admission into a lucrative 
labor market in exchange for some of the privileges other residents 
of the jurisdiction enjoy. 
If the Bush proposal is enacted, there is no doubt that many 
foreign and undocumented workers will take the offer. But their 
consent does not necessarily ensure that the offer is fair. Some critics 
charge that guestworker programs are unjust because they exploit 
or take unfair advantage of foreign labor. The host country gains 
at the expense of its guests, who do the dirty work of the society in 
exchange for low wages and second-class status. The fact that the 
guests do the work willingly does not remove the taint of unfair 
ness, for it is wrong to take advantage of vulnerable people. Wealthy 
countries must therefore offer something better, or they should 
make no offer at all. If they will not treat as equals the newcomers 
1. 'Tact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform," Press Release by the 
Office of the Press Secretary, 7 January 2004. 
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who do their dirty work, justice demands that hosts do the dirty 
work themselves, offering a good wage that will entice citizens to 
get the job done. 
Michael Walzer has set forth the most famous egalitarian ver 
sion of this argument,2 but guestworker programs also appear to 
be exploitative from a purely capitalist standpoint. Daniel Attas 
has shown that guestworker programs are unfair according to 
neoclassical theory because they restrict competition and result in 
deviations from the equilibrium price for labor.3 This is a rare case 
where left and right converge, and we might therefore conclude 
that guestworker programs are hopelessly unfair and exploitative. 
However advantageous the offers seem to guests or hosts, decent 
governments should not make them. 
But in this article I will show that neither the egalitarian nor the 
neoclassical critique of guestworker programs is convincing. Such 
programs are not invariably exploitative, as the critics maintain. We 
must therefore be more discriminating in our judgments, and we 
need a standard of exploitation that is more discriminating too. The 
egalitarian and neoclassical theories of exploitation sometimes miss 
the mark and clash with intuitions about what seems like taking 
unfair advantage of others. A better alternative is the sufficiency 
standard, as I call it, which judges transactions from the standpoint 
of those who have enough. Such agents are not exploitable, and if 
they would accept an offer it cannot be deemed exploitative. On this 
standard some guestworker programs do not seem unfair and so 
are 
morally acceptable. Others are unjust, but unfairness by itself 
is not the only relevant consideration in assessing these programs. 
Sometimes the moral force of the injustice is weak and can be over 
ridden by the transaction's good consequences, especially for guests. 
Then we ought to tolerate guestworker programs, even when they 
are 
exploitative. In tolerating such programs our hands do get a little 
dirty, but the moral costs of the dirt are less than the price foreign 
labor pays for the purist policy. There is such a thing as acceptable 
exploitation, in other words, and the Bush administration proposal 
may fall within that category. 
My argument unfolds in five steps. First, I show why the egalitar 
ian and neoclassical criticisms of guestworker programs fail. Next, 
I set forth the alternative sufficiency standard of exploitation. In 
the third section I assess two classic guestworker programs accord 
2. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New 
York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 52-63. 
3. Daniel Attas, "The Case of Guest Workers: Exploitation, Citizenship and 
Economic Rights," Res Publica 6/1 (2000): 73-92. 
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ing to this Standard. The fourth part examines the moral force of 
exploitation claims and determines when good consequences can 
outweigh the unfairness of guestworker transactions. The last sec 
tion concludes. 
The Problem of Privileged Guests 
Although the concept of exploitation is especially associated with 
Marxian theory, capitalist economics has a theory of exploitation 
too. According to the neoclassical standard, imperfect competition 
makes it possible for some agents to take unfair advantage of others.4 
Exploiters have market power, which permits them to dictate price 
to the disadvantaged. The latter do not get the equilibrium price, 
which is set by perfect competition. Exploiters thus gain at their 
expense by paying less or receiving more than would be possible if 
competition was perfect. Monopoly is the classic example: for want 
of competition, monopolists are in an excellent position to take unfair 
advantage of dependent customers by charging exorbitant prices. 
Attas nicely shows that if we adopt the neoclassical standard of 
exploitation, guestworker programs must be deemed exploitative. 
These programs typically restrict foreign labor 
to 
employment in a particular industry, sector or, sometimes, even employer. 
Hence, in so far as this conditional force creates effective monoposonies that 
skew wages and make the exchange unequal, it appears that not only are 
guest workers exploited, but also that their exploitation may be as acute 
as that of slaves when their freedom of exchange is restricted to dealing 
with one possible employer only.5 
Guestworkers do not get the equilibrium price for their labor be 
cause they are consigned to certain types of jobs and prevented from 
competing freely in the host labor market. In the sectors where they 
do work, "the equilibrium price without their presence would be 
significantly higher" since domestic labor will not work for the low 
wages paid to guests.6 Domestic labor and capital therefore gain at 
the expense of guestworkers by earning more than they would if no 
restrictions were placed on the newcomers. If competition was free, 
the guests could compete for the better paid jobs of native work 
4. For examples of the neoclassical theory of exploitation see A. C. Pigou, 
The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 549-71; and David Miller, 
"Exploitation in the Market," in Modern Theories of Exploitation, ed. Andrew Reeve 
(London: Sage Publications, 1987), pp. 149-65. 
5. Attas, "The Case of Guest Workers," p. 78. 
6. Ibid., p. 79. 
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ers. Fewer guests would then be available to do the dirty work, so 
they would have to be paid more. In turn the natives would face 
increased competition, and that will drive down their wages. But 
the whole point of guestworker programs is to restrict competition, 
so that natives gain at the expense of guests. These programs exist 
precisely in order to exploit, the critics charge. 
According to Attas, the unfairness of guestworker programs is 
economic, not political. Guestworkers receive less than the equilib 
rium price for their labor, but the denial of citizenship to them is 
not necessarily unfair. Current members have broad discretion to 
grant or withhold political membership because they possess "the 
right to collective self-determination; the right of the community 
to 
shape itself, its character, the production of social goods and 
their maintenance and distribution."7 Fellow citizens must exhibit 
loyalty, "but in the absence of any such indications, guest work 
ers have no special claim to citizenship."8 Thus they need not be 
set on the path to naturalization when they are admitted into the 
jurisdiction of the state. But Attas insists that guestworkers must 
"be granted full equal membership at least with respect to their role 
in the economy."9 Above all, their basic human right to freedom of 
occupation must be scrupulously respected. Guestworkers must be 
free to seek work where they can find it and to compete with na 
tive workers. "This might be all that is needed to expel the spectre 
of exploitation. Were guest workers to enjoy the same economic 
rights as local workers, and particularly the freedom of occupational 
choice, then the cause of unequal exchange would be removed."10 
Exploitation would be abolished. 
Attas's position is explicitly contrasted with the view of Michael 
Walzer, who argues from an egalitarian standpoint. For Walzer 
the injustice of guestworker programs is fundamentally political: 
guestworkers are only admitted into the jurisdiction of the state as 
second-class members, and because they are second-class members 
it is easy to exploit them economically. 
As a group, [guestworkers] constitute a disenfranchised class. They are 
typically an exploited or oppressed class as well, and they are exploited or 
oppressed at least in part because they are disenfranchised, incapable of 
organizing effectively for self-defense. Their material condition is unlikely 
to be improved except by altering their political status. Indeed, the purpose 
7. Ibid., p. 84. 
8. Ibid., p. 86. 
9. Ibid., p. 88. 
10. Ibid., p. 88. 
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of their status is to prevent them from improving their condition; for if 
they could do that, they would soon be like domestic workers, unwilling 
to take on hard and degrading work or accept low rates of pay.11 
Guestworkers will not be allowed to compete freely, as Attas desires, 
as long as they are not political equals. But guestworkers cannot 
become political equals until we stop treating them as guests. 
Although Walzer rarely uses the language of exploitation 
to frame his critique, it is clear from the text that the injustice of 
guestworker programs results from host countries taking unfair 
advantage of their guests.12 They drive a hard bargain, trading 
admission for an entitlement all other long-term residents en 
joy?political membership. The transaction results in inequality, 
but this violates the egalitarian standard of exploitation Walzer 
adopts. When some accept less than an equal share in order to avoid 
a worse outcome, they are exploited?even if the choice is made in 
a 
competitive market. 
Though Walzer describes a "complex" egalitarianism in Spheres 
of Justice, his argument against guestworker laws is in fact an ex 
ample of what he calls "simple equality" or equal outcomes.13 All 
residents deserve political membership as compensation for the 
imposition of subjection; hence any who have been relegated to a 
second-class status are treated unfairly. "Men and women are either 
subject to the state's authority, or they are not; and if they are subject, 
they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what that 
authority does."14 Outcomes must be equal, even if some outsiders 
might consent to less in order to gain admission. Citizenship is an 
inalienable entitlement of (prolonged) residency, at least in modern 
democratic nations, and thus no agreement to yield the entitlement 
can be valid: 
Democratic citizens, then, have a choice: if they want to bring in new 
workers, they must be prepared to enlarge their own membership; if they 
are 
unwilling to accept new members, they must find ways within the 
limits of the domestic labor market to get socially necessary work done. 
And those are their 
only choices.15 
11. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 59. 
12. On Walzer's idea of dominance as a concept of exploitation see Robert 
Mayer, "A Walzerian Theory of Exploitation/' Polity 34 (2002): 337-54. 
13. On the simple egalitarian impulse in Walzer's theory see Robert Mayer, 
"Michael Walzer, Industrial Democracy and Complex Equality/7 Political Theory 29 
(2001): 237-61. 
14. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 61. 
15. Ibid., p. 61. 
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Walzer is not a Marxist, but the simple-egalitarian standard of 
exploitation implied by his critique of guestworker programs is 
similar to the standard adopted by neomarxian exploitation theory. 
If one would be better off taking an equal share than accepting what 
is offered, neomarxian theory holds, that offer is exploitative.16 Hence 
any transfer of surplus from labor to capital is exploitation, no matter 
how well off the workers are in absolute terms. Any deviation from 
equal shares is unfair. Marxists argue that no one can legitimately 
make a profit off others, and for the same egalitarian reason Walzer 
insists that no nation can legitimately buy the political rights of 
resident aliens. 
When it comes to guestworker laws Walzer is a simple egali 
tarian, but his complex-egalitarian theory warns us to be skeptical 
about equalizing outcomes. And in a footnote to his argument Wal 
zer identifies an exception that undercuts his sweeping rejection of 
guestworker programs: 
It has been suggested to me that this argument doesn't plausibly apply 
to privileged guests: technical advisors, visiting professors, and so on. I 
concede the point, though Fm not sure just how to describe the category 
of 
"guest workers" so as to exclude these others.17 
Walzer goes on to dismiss the exception as unimportant, but in fact 
this case points to a clash between the egalitarian standard of exploi 
tation and intuitions about what counts as taking unfair advantage of 
others. Unequal outcomes are not always unfair, even when it comes 
to distributing political membership in democratic societies. 
Consider a guestworker program designed to attract skilled 
foreign labor on temporary contracts. The workers come for several 
years and are employed in sectors of the economy where there is a 
shortage of skilled labor. They are paid good wages, though perhaps 
less than domestic workers can command, but they are not set on 
the path to naturalization and are denied certain government ben 
efits. The idea is not hypothetical: many such programs exist. The 
American H-1B visa program is an example.18 It attracts engineers 
and hi-tech workers from other lands, especially South Asia. The 
program grew rapidly during the full-employment economy of 
the late 1990s, but the number of visas has recently been cut. Since 
16. For an influential example of neomarxian exploitation theory see John 
Roemer, Free to Lose: An Introduction to Marxist Economic Philosophy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
17. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 60. 
18. Matthew Heller, "Companies Trying to Hire Foreign Professionals Face a 
Lower Cap on Visas," Workforce Management 83/2 (2004): 64-65. 
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the 1970s Saudi Arabia has also recruited highly skilled workers 
from developed nations on a contract basis, without the prospect 
of naturalization. 
These are guestworker programs, too, but the transaction does 
not seem obviously exploitative. Admission is granted on a second 
class basis, but the workers are well compensated and they cannot 
plausibly be described as desperate. They have good options, and 
so it does not seem possible that anyone could take advantage of 
them. They make a choice, working abroad for good money but 
only on a temporary basis. How could the transaction be unfair? 
The hosts do not appear to gain at their expense. 
The objection applies as well to the neoclassical argument. 
Privileged guests are frequently sponsored by a particular em 
ployer, and the guests are tied to this job. They lack freedom of 
occupation, but it is still hard to view them as exploited. The re 
striction may reduce their incomes because it prevents these skilled 
guests from applying for work elsewhere, but failure to maximize 
gains hardly seems like proof of exploitation. The host employ 
ers must compete for their skills in the international labor market 
and offer a good salary. These guests are clearly not sweatshop 
workers, who may lack decent options. If the pay is good and the 
workers have alternatives, it does not seem unfair to ask them to 
yield their (alleged) right to freedom of occupation in exchange 
for admission. After all, not all rights are inalienable. Some can be 
sold if the price is right. 
With regard to guestworker programs, both egalitarian and 
neoclassical exploitation theory are too sweeping and indis 
criminate in their judgments. They both claim that guestworker 
transactions are always unfair to the guests, but that is not so. 
Privileged guests do not seem exploited, even when they forego 
the rights to freedom of occupation or naturalization. The host 
countries do not take unfair advantage of them. But if that intuition 
is correct, it suggests that we need a different and more sensitive 
standard of exploitation. Neither unequal outcomes nor devia 
tions from the equilibrium price are proof that exploitation has 
occurred. A different calculation is required to determine when 
taking advantage becomes unfair. 
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The Sufficiency Standard 
Exploitation is a process of expanding inequality.19 Exploiters 
start with more and use that advantage to gain at the expense of the 
disadvantaged party. Consider the classic Marxian example: capi 
talists begin with more than propertyless workers and exploit this 
advantage to extract surplus value from labor. They get more because 
they start with more, and at the end of the transaction the advantaged 
party is in an even better position to exploit once again. 
Exploitative transactions begin with either an offer or a threat. 
Threats reduce our options while offers expand them.20 Exploit 
ative threats are directly coercive; taking advantage in this way is 
called extortion. But exploitative offers also depend on coercion to 
succeed, even though the offer itself is not coercive. The exploiter's 
offer increases the exploitable agent's options, but nonexploitative 
options are unavailable due to the coercive power of the state, which 
protects the existing distribution of assets. The exploiter does not 
have to coerce in order to take advantage because another agent is 
enforcing the rules of the game, which disadvantage the exploitable 
party.21 In guestworker transactions, for example, host employers are 
able to exploit foreign labor because the host government is using its 
coercive power to block other options, such as permanent residency 
with equal rights. The guests are not forced to come by the hosts, 
but they are forced to choose from a constrained set of options, the 
best of which may result in others gaining at their expense. 
By definition exploiters gain when they take advantage, but it 
is also true that the disadvantaged party frequently gains from an 
exploitative exchange. Without the jobs capital offers, labor might 
starve. Being exploited, then, is usually better than the alternative. 
That is in fact why exploitation works. Exploitative exchanges are 
typically mutually advantageous.22 Both gain from the trade, but 
the gains are disproportionate. This is why these transactions are 
considered unfair. 
19. On the concept of exploitation see Robert Goodin, "Exploiting a Situation 
and Exploiting a Person/' in Modern Theories of Exploitation, pp. 166-200; Alan 
Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Ruth 
Sample, Exploitation: What It Is and Why It's Wrong (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). 
20. On 
exploitative threats and offers see Michael Gorr, Coercion, Freedom and 
Exploitation (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), pp. 147-65. 
21. On the role of coercion in exploitative offers see Alan Carting, "Exploitation, 
Extortion and Oppression," Political Studies 35 (1987): 173-88. 
22. On mutually advantageous exploitation see Wertheimer, Exploitation, 
pp. 13-24. 
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Every theory of exploitation implies an idea of the just price. 
Exploited parties do not receive the just price for what they offer; the 
exploiters cheat them, whether wittingly or not. But there are differ 
ent ways to calculate the just price. That is why there are different 
theories of exploitation. In neomarxian theory equal shares is the 
standard of justice; hence any transfer of surplus is exploitative or 
unfair. In neoclassical theory the equilibrium price is the just price. 
The price monopolists can command is unfair because customers 
are at their mercy. 
But the example of privileged guests demonstrates that neither 
of these standards is satisfactory. Skilled contract workers may not 
get the equilibrium price for their labor, since competition is con 
strained, but they do not seem to be exploited. These workers also 
do not get equal citizenship?the egalitarian just price for the burden 
of subjection?but again it is hard to view them as exploited. They 
seem to get a fair price for what they offer, and so there is no gain 
at their expense. 
But why is this so? The answer, I think, is that they begin with 
enough. They earn decent wages at home and have options; they are 
not driven by necessity. If they choose to work abroad temporarily, 
yielding certain rights in exchange for better pay and adventure, the 
transaction seems fair because these guests negotiate from a position 
of sufficiency. While they have less than the host country and their 
prospective employers, they have enough, and that circumstance 
makes them unexploitable. You cannot take advantage of someone 
who has enough, for then there is no vulnerability to exploit. Enjoy 
ing sufficiency is the best defense against exploitation.23 
If this is correct, exploitable agents must not have enough 
of some relevant asset. They experience insufficiency, and that 
is why they accept exploitative offers. They are willing to get 
less than the just price because the alternative is still worse. 
Exploitable agents choose in a context of insufficiency, and this 
motivates them to accept their best offer, even if it is poor, in 
order to make the best of a bad lot. For them being exploited is 
usually the lesser evil. 
Not all exploitable agents are exploited, however. If the 
advantaged party does not press the advantage, the exchange 
may be fair. Consider an example. Unemployed workers who 
have exhausted their benefits are extremely vulnerable where 
23. The exploitable insufficiency is not always financial. Affluent people who are 
emotionally needy can be exploited by someone with less income. These vulnerable 
individuals make enough money but still lack sufficient well-being and so can be 
taken advantage of. 
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there is a glut of labor. Unscrupulous employers could offer 
them a mere pittance for sweatshop work. But if an employer 
with a heart of gold offers these vulnerable workers high wages 
and good conditions, we would not describe the transaction as 
exploitative. Though the unemployed do not begin with enough 
in either case, in the latter exchange the employer does not gain 
at the employees' expense. No exploitation has occurred. 
We only think that agents are exploited if they gain too 
little from the transaction or pay too much for what they do 
gain. When jobs are scarce people tend to take their first offer, 
but if the wage is very low and the work is hard, we think the 
employees gain less than they should. Sweatshop jobs do not 
pay enough, even when they pay more than the alternatives. It 
is the insufficiency of the compensation that renders these jobs 
exploitative. The employer offers more than competitors but 
less than is sufficient. 
But how do we know how much is enough? For an answer we 
look to an agent who starts above the threshold of sufficiency24 If 
one who has enough might plausibly take the offer, that offer is not 
exploitative. After all, someone with enough at the start is unexploit 
able; hence that agent cannot be exploited. This agent becomes the 
standard by which to assess transactions. For example, if someone 
who already earns a secure living wage switches jobs, we can as 
sume that a just price was paid for labor. But if that individual would 
spurn the offer as insufficient, the offer is exploitative. One party is 
trying to gain at the expense of the other by offering less than the 
just price. 
The sufficiency standard requires us to determine how much 
is enough in any given case. That may seem like a hopeless task, 
for sufficiency is culturally and historically relative. What is 
enough in one time or place may not be enough in another. And 
even within any given culture, there is usually disagreement 
about exactly how much is enough. It may therefore seem that 
the sufficiency standard is too subjective to settle our disputes. 
But I think this is false. In fact modern societies constantly en 
gage in threshold setting about the level of sufficiency, and there 
is usually a broad consensus about how much is enough. We set 
24. The proper benchmark is a person (1) just above the threshold of 
sufficiency and (2) for whom sufficiency is guaranteed. The latter circumstance 
is crucial and assumed in all of my examples. Someone at the level of sufficiency 
can still be exploited if that sufficiency is insecure. The nonexploitative standard 
is thus an individual who is guaranteed sufficiency if she rejects an offer made 
by another agent. 
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poverty lines, minimum and living wage rates, overtime rules, 
housing standards, and so forth. All of these are measures of 
sufficiency in a given time and place. We may not agree to the 
dollar or euro about how much income is enough, but precise 
measures like that are unnecessary to assess exploitative trans 
actions. I do not have to know exactly how much is enough to 
know that well-paid American engineers who take three-year 
contracts in Saudi Arabia are not exploited, even if the Saudis 
refuse to naturalize them. They start with enough and so cannot 
be exploited. The prospect of exploitation only arises for those 
who are not guaranteed a living wage, and within any given 
culture members have a rough, intersubjective idea of what that 
wage is.25 
My claim is that the sufficiency standard best matches intu 
itions about which transactions are exploitative.26 When we say 
people have been taken unfair advantage of, I believe, we do so 
because we think that (1) they will not have enough if they refuse 
the offer but (2) gain less from the transaction or pay more than 
would one who begins with enough. 
Because it takes sufficiency as the benchmark for assess 
ing transactions, this standard could be classified as a liberal 
egalitarian theory of exploitation. Its nonexploitative ideal is a 
society in which everyone begins with at least enough. Inequali 
ties above that threshold are permissible, but priority should be 
placed on reducing insufficiency.27 As I will show in the fourth 
section, this priority has interesting implications for the choice 
between exploitative and nonexploitative policies. 
Before that question is broached, however, I will apply the 
sufficiency standard to two classic guestworker programs. As we 
shall see, given this standard the exploitativeness of guestworker 
arrangements is often mixed: while there is usually a degree of ex 
25. A sufficiency wage is at least a living wage. On the theory and practice of 
the living wage see Robert Pollin and Stephanie Luce, The Living Wage: Building a 
Fair Economy (New York: New Press, 1998). 
26. On intuition as the test of adequacy in contemporary moral theory see Will 
Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), pp. 5-8. 
27. Within the liberal egalitarian camp, the sufficiency standard most closely 
matches Richard Arneson's prioritarian theory, which tilts in favor of those who are 
badly off. See Richard Arneson, "Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism// Ethics 
110 (2000): 339-49. A related theory is Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach, 
which aims to raise as many people as possible above a threshold of well-being. 
See Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Wed, 13 May 2015 17:50:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
322 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 
ploitation in programs that recruit unskilled labor, even temporary 
workers without special skills sometimes appear to gain a just price 
for their labor. 
From Theory to Practice 
Highly skilled guestworkers are not typically exploited, but most 
guestworkers are not highly skilled. This increases the chance that 
they will be exploited, for semi-skilled or unskilled workers will 
usually begin with less and will likely get less as well. This is also 
true in the domestic labor market. The sufficiency standard therefore 
points us toward the bottom half of the occupational structure as the 
place where exploitation is more likely to occur. By contrast, Marxian 
exploitation theory finds exploitation wherever profits are made from 
labor, skilled or unskilled, while neoclassical exploitation theory sees 
no 
exploitation at the bottom as long as competition is robust. The 
sufficiency standard occupies a middle position between the two. 
In deciding whether a guestworker contract is exploitative from 
the sufficiency standpoint, we must consider what a typical person 
above the threshold of sufficiency from the labor-exporting nation 
might choose to do. This is the appropriate counterfactual bench 
mark because prospective guestworkers who refuse the host-nation 
offer remain at home. We judge their exploitability by whether they 
will have enough if they do not migrate, and we judge exploitable 
workers to be exploited if they gain less than one with enough at 
home would likely accept. The proper benchmark, then, is a potential 
guest who starts with enough. We ask whether that person would 
accept a temporary job in another land at the level of compensation 
being offered. 
Let us begin with the paradigmatic guestworker program: the 
West German recruitment of Turkish workers during the 1960s.28 
In her fine book Exporting Workers, Suzanne Paine shows that the 
conventional assumption?that guestworkers come from the poor 
est strata of society?is mistaken for this case. In fact, the Turkish 
"migrants tended to be better off than their fellow countrymen."29 
They were on average better educated and more skilled than Turks 
28. On the history of guestworker programs see Cindy Hahamovitch, "Creating 
Perfect Immigrants: Guestworkers of the World in Historical Perspective," Labor 
History 44 (2003): 69-94. On the origin, development, and termination of the German 
Gastarbeiter program see Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 
1880-1980 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 209-54. 
29. Suzanne Paine, Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), pp. 79-86. 
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who remained at home. They were less likely to be unemployed 
and tended to earn higher incomes before emigrating. Indeed, the 
income of the average Turkish worker was one-third less than the 
income of the future guestworkers before they left for Germany. 
This pattern is often repeated. Guestworkers tend to come from 
somewhere in the middle part of the occupational structure, not the 
very bottom, because the poorest workers cannot afford the cost 
of travel or the risk that a job might fall through. For that reason 
guestworker programs are more complicated to assess, because they 
typically do not attract the most vulnerable workers. The guests 
often have some options, but whether the options are sufficient is 
the crucial question. 
Survey results give us a clue to the answer. According to Paine, 
three-quarters of the Turkish guests cited financial difficulties as 
their primary motive for migrating.30 Many had debts to repay or 
were unable to save anything out of their current wages. Despite 
being better off than the typical Turk, many of the guests did not 
seem to have enough or possess sufficiency before accepting the 
German offer. They were therefore exploitable, although most could 
not be described as desperate. 
But were the Turkish guestworkers also exploited? Did they 
receive less than a Turk with enough would be willing to take? 
Some no doubt did, but a large share of the Turkish guestworkers 
were well compensated. The German unions insisted that guest 
workers be paid as much as German workers in comparable jobs, 
which were chiefly in construction and industry.31 In Paine's sur 
vey the average wage was actually 10% less than native Germans 
earned in these sectors.32 But living expenses were relatively low, 
hence the guests could save much of their income. Paine reports 
that the typical guestworker earned four times more than before 
departure, and six times as much as the typical Turkish worker 
who remained at home.33 Their German wages vaulted many guests 
to the top strata of the domestic Turkish income scale. The typical 
guestworker was saving each year the equivalent of two years of 
take-home pay for the average domestic worker. This is why the 
30. Paine, Exporting Workers, pp. 200, 87-88. 
31. On union protection for guestworkers see James Hollifield, Immigrants, 
Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 59-60; and Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, 
Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), p. 129. 
32. Paine, Exporting Workers p. 99. 
33. Ibid., p. 100. 
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waiting list for prospective Turkish guestworkers stretched years 
into the future. 
More than half of the Turkish guestworkers appear to have 
earned well above the sufficiency level in their native land. But de 
ductions from their earnings must be made for the low quality of the 
work, the costs of family separation, the difficult living conditions, 
and the discrimination Turks experienced in Germany34 These fac 
tors would influence the decision of a worker in the home country 
who begins with enough. Given this discount, the share of Turkish 
guestworkers which we would judge to be exploited grows, but for 
a goodly number the level of compensation was sufficiently high 
and thus not exploitative. Certainly the Germans were in a position 
to exploit their guests, and no doubt some unscrupulous employers 
did. But union protection prevented wholesale exploitation of the 
guestworkers, and the high level of compensation seems to have 
rendered the exchange acceptable for many. In Paine's survey one 
half of the Turkish guests reported satisfaction with the experience, 
and many stayed in Germany year after year.35 
Although Walzer depicts the German case as paradigmatically 
exploitative, closer attention to the level of compensation suggests 
that the Gastarbeiter program was, at least with regard to compensa 
tion, a model which other nations should imitate. The pay for many 
guestworkers was good and sufficiently high to avoid eroding the 
wages of German unskilled workers.36 At the very least one can say 
that there are much worse cases of guestworker exploitation than 
the German program of the 1960s.37 
34. On the human costs of guestwork in Germany see Herbert, History of Foreign 
Labor, pp. 218-20, 225-28. 
35. Paine, Exporting Workers, p. 98. 
36. Turkish guestworkers in Germany benefited from the relatively compressed 
wage scale, which paid blue-collar workers only a little less than the median income. 
A median income in Germany was a very high income in Turkey. In the United States, 
by contrast, income inequality is much greater and unskilled guests will therefore 
earn well below the median income. See Philip Martin, Guestworker Programs: Lessons 
from Europe (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 1980), p. 39. 
37. After the Gastarbeiter program was terminated in 1973, Germany did 
not 
expel its large guest population. Assimilation and naturalization of these 
immigrants proceeded slowly, but many analysts offer a positive assessment of 
this subsequent chapter in the German guestworker story. Even without German 
citizenship, the Turkish guests won many of the rights enjoyed by ethnic Germans. 
See Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in 
Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); David Jacobson, Rights across 
Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1996); and Christian Joppke, 'The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: 
The United States, Germany, and the European Union/' Comparative Political Studies 
34 (2001): 339-66. 
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A case in point is the Bracero program established by the United 
States during the Second World War.38 This program recruited Mexi 
can workers on temporary contracts, chiefly for agricultural labor. 
Most braceros did stoop work, picking cotton or lettuce or grapes 
during the harvest season. Back-breaking work like this rarely at 
tracts anyone who has enough, so the recruits are almost certainly 
exploitable. According to Jaime Storey, the typical bracero was "on 
the upper level of the very poorest sectors of the population/739 Many 
were landless day-laborers, underemployed in Mexico and living near 
the level of subsistence. Their options were quite poor, and this put 
them at a severe disadvantage in bargaining with the Americans. 
By Mexican standards, however, the American farmers paid ex 
cellent wages. Even after deductions for room, board, and insurance, 
the braceros often earned more than ten times the typical Mexican 
farm wage.40 A guestworker could return from a 90-day contract 
with hundreds of dollars in savings, the equivalent of two or three 
years of subsistence in rural Mexico. Typically, some of the savings 
would be invested in housing or tools or land, or used to set up a 
small business. A bracero who found steady work during his short 
stay in the United States, and who was not cheated by his employ 
ers, could return to his village with considerably more money than 
a merchant or skilled craftsman might make in a year. 
But not all braceros were this lucky. Some did not find steady 
work, and others were cheated by unscrupulous employers. De 
ductions for room and board could often be unreasonable, and the 
wages paid were frequently below the hourly rate for American 
farm workers?a practice that was illegal but rarely punished. The 
living conditions were spartan, at best, and the work was certainly 
dirty and difficult.41 Although many returning guests reported sat 
38. On the history of temporary worker recruitment programs in the 
United States see Vernon Briggs, "Nonimmigrant Labor Policy: Future Trend 
or Aberration?" in The Unavoidable Issue: U.S. Immigration Policy in the 1980s, ed. 
Demetrios Papademetrious and Mark Miller (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study 
of Human Issues, 1983), pp. 93-122. On the Bracero program see Ernesto Galarza, 
Strangers in Our Fields (Washington: Fund for the Republic, 1956); Ernesto Galarza, 
Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story (Charlotte: McNally & Loftin, 1964); 
and Kitty Cala vita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. 
(New York: Routledge, 1992). 
39. Jaime Storey, "The Braceros" in Uprooted: Braceros in the Hermanos Mayo 
Lens, ed. Jaime Storey and John Mraz (Houston: Arte P?blico Press, 1996), p. 43. 
40. See the figures cited in Galarza, Strangers in Our Fields, pp. 2-3, 30,36; and 
Michael Belshaw, A Village Economy: Land and People ofHuecorio (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967), pp. 124-33, 324-25. 
41. For accounts of these abuses see Galarza, Strangers in Our Fields and 
Merchants of Labor. 
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isfaction with the experience, others said that in el norte "one is not 
free because one is a slave of work/'42 
These factors are a discount on the wages earned from guest 
work and would certainly affect the calculation of a Mexican who 
began with a sufficiency income. Knowing the costs of agricultural 
guestwork, would an individual already at the level of sufficiency 
still make the journey? It seems unlikely, as several empirical stud 
ies demonstrate. Michael Belshaw offers an in-depth portrait of one 
Mexican community from which braceros were recruited in A Village 
Economy.43 Scarcely anyone in the village earned a sufficiency wage, 
and the few who did never became braceros. Richard Hancock also 
reports that landowners in Chihuahua rarely traveled north, even 
when their plots were small, because a farm of one's own was so 
highly prized. And though a bracero could earn more than some 
middle-class Mexicans, none of the latter would dream of doing 
stoop work for the Americans.44 The discount on the wages was 
very steep. Only someone without enough would accept an offer 
on these terms. 
We might therefore conclude that the Bracero program was ex 
ploitative for the great majority of the Mexican guests. They earned 
less than someone with enough would find acceptable. American 
farmers and consumers gained at the expense of these workers, 
who were not paid a sufficiency wage for the hard work they did. 
Because the discount is so high, agricultural guestworker programs 
will almost invariably be exploitative.45 
By comparing the Gastarbeiter and Bracero programs we can 
identify six factors that increase the likelihood of exploitation in 
guestworker arrangements: first, if the work is agricultural rather 
than industrial;46 second, if guests are paid less than the prevailing 
42. Belshaw, A Village Economy, p. 126. Belshaw includes a series of first hand 
accounts in his chapter on the braceros, pp. 123-33. 
43. See the chapter on the labor force in Belshaw, A Village Economy, pp. 96-155. 
44. Richard Hancock, The Role of the Bracero in the Economic and Cultural Dynamics 
of Mexico: A Case Study of Chihuahua (Stanford: Hispanic American Society, 1959), 
pp. 105,124. 
45. On the plight of agricultural guestworkers see Alec Wilkinson, Big Sugar: 
Seasons in the Cane Fields of Florida (New York: Knopf, 1989); M. L. Hall, "Defending 
the Rights of H-2A Farmworkers/' North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 27/3 (2002): 521-37; and Laura Oliveira, 'A License to Exploit: 
The Need to Reform the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Guest Worker Program/7 
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues 5 (2002): 153-78. 
46. Guestworkers who do domestic labor also tend to experience harsh 
exploitation. On the plight of female domestic guestworkers see Rhacel Parrenas, 
Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001); Christine Chen, In Service and Servitude: Foreign Female 
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wage in the host nation; third, if income inequality in the host na 
tion is large; fourth, if a host nation does not have to compete with 
neighbors to recruit guests;47 fifth, if enforcement of contract provi 
sions by the host government is lax; and sixth, if the discount factor 
is high due to harsh living conditions, abuse, or bigotry in the host 
country. With regard to the sixth item the United States may have 
been no worse than West Germany, but America surely scored worse 
on the first five. The Bracero program was for these reasons more 
thoroughly exploitative than the Gastarbeiter system. The disadvanta 
geous position of the Mexican guests was o ver determined. 
Unfortunately, it seems that many of these conditions persist 
as the United States contemplates establishing a new guestworker 
program for unskilled labor. True, many of America's twenty-first 
century guestworkers will be employed in factories or service sec 
tor jobs, not on the farm. But it is also true that they will not make 
much more than the minimum wage, which is well below a living 
wage for domestic workers. We also have good reason to fear that 
oversight of employers will continue to be lax. It therefore seems 
doubtful that someone with enough in labor-exporting nations like 
Mexico would take these unskilled jobs at the wages being offered, 
especially if the status is only temporary. Many immigrants put 
up with low wages and bad work when they first arrive in order 
to become American citizens. But if that prize is not available, this 
temporary opportunity will only seem advantageous to one who 
does not already have enough. 
Acceptable Exploitation 
All three theories of exploitation considered in this article would 
judge the Bracero program to be exploitative. But they do so for dif 
ferent reasons. For Walzer the unfairness was the refusal to set the 
Mexican hands on the path to American citizenship. For Attas the 
unfairness was the restriction of these guestworkers to specific jobs 
or 
employers. But according to the sufficiency standard the unfair 
ness lay in the inadequate level of remuneration, which was less than 
someone with enough would accept. These exploitable workers did 
Domestic Workers and the Malaysian '''Modernity" Project (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998); Nicole Constable, Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of 
Filipina Workers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Daniel Bell, "Equal 
Rights for Foreign Resident Workers?" Dissent 48/4 (2001): 26-34. 
47. One reason why the Gastarbeiter program was less exploitative was that 
West Germany had to compete with other European nations for guestworkers. On 
this point see Hahamovitch, "Creating Perfect Immigrants," p. 85. 
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not gain as much as a Mexican at the level of sufficiency would have 
found acceptable. But if the level of compensation had been higher, 
the loss of freedom of occupation or citizenship would not have 
mattered. The workers would have made enough to compensate 
them for the sacrifices guestworker status entails. They would have 
become identical to highly skilled guests, who are not exploited. 
Once we have decided that an offer is exploitative, however, the 
task of assessment is not finished. We have established that the offer 
is unfair, but next we must consider how unfair it is.48 If the unfair 
ness is modest, and the transaction produces significantly better 
consequences for the disadvantaged party than the likely alternative, 
we 
ought to tolerate the exploitation as a lesser evil. Prohibiting the 
exchange will do more harm than good, especially for the one who 
is vulnerable. Sometimes exploitation is the lesser evil. 
This problem only arises because exploitative offers tend to be 
mutually advantageous. Both parties gain by trading. The gains are 
not proportionate, but a lesser gain for the disadvantaged party may 
yield much more utility than the cheap gain for the exploiter, pre 
cisely because the one who is exploited starts with less. The exploiter 
can take it or leave it, but the exploitable agent really needs the gain. 
For that reason we have to think twice about blocking the exchange. 
It may be preferable to permit the injustice in order to improve the 
situation of the exploited party. Indeed, Alan Wertheimer argues 
that "we start from the presumption that a mutually advantageous 
and consensual agreement should be permitted/' even when it is 
exploitative, precisely because the moral force of exploitation claims 
is relatively low.49 
We can think of acceptable exploitation as the "dirty hands" 
problem in just-price theory. We tolerate an injustice for the sake of 
the good consequences that result. In just war theory dirty hands 
are 
only permissible in cases of emergency, when the survival of a 
people is at risk.50 But the stakes in economic exchanges are much 
lower. One rarely exploits out of necessity, and the prospective 
guests are rarely so desperate as to have no other choice. The host 
country is not forced to get its hands dirty; it chooses to do so. Such 
choices are impermissible when innocent lives are at stake, but 
economic exploitation is usually a much less dirty business. It does 
not kill, and in fact it can make its victims better off than if they are 
not exploited at all. 
48. Wertheimer, Exploitation, pp. 278-309. 
49. Ibid., p. 296. 
50. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 251-68. 
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In recognizing the dirty-hands problem in mutually advanta 
geous transactions, however, we must avoid giving host nations or 
employers a license to exploit foreign labor mercilessly. There are 
limits to acceptable exploitation, and they must be clearly specified. 
I hold that taking unfair advantage of others is permissible only if 
(1) the exploitation is modest, not severe, and (2) this exploitation 
significantly enhances the well-being of the exploited party com 
pared to the most likely clean-hands alternative. 
With regard to the first condition, how do we know that the 
exploitation is modest? The sufficiency threshold provides the 
answer. If the discounted level of compensation approaches the 
amount that an agent with enough would accept, the exploitation 
is modest. Many bracero guestworkers probably fell in this category. 
As noted in the previous section, a temporary Mexican farmhand 
in the 1950s could often earn ten or twelve times more than a day 
laborer who remained at home. But with the discount for family 
separation, bigotry, and back-breaking work, this high wage was 
probably still too low to attract Mexicans who started at the level of 
sufficiency. Still, it was not a slave wage. If the host employers paid 
the prevailing wage of American farmhands, as the law mandated, 
and did not cheat or abuse their braceros, the exploitation was likely 
modest, not severe. The biggest problem with the Bracero program 
was that too many employers paid less than the prevailing wage 
or cheated their guests in other ways.51 The rules were broken and 
oversight was lax, and these abuses increased the level of exploita 
tion experienced by many braceros unacceptably. Unless the United 
States improves its oversight mechanisms, we have reason to fear 
that a new guestworker program will frequently violate this first 
condition of acceptable exploitation.52 
51. One might be justifiably pessimistic that the United States could avoid 
perpetrating these abuses again, in which case it ought not to establish a guestworker 
program. But Hahamovitch argues that the abuses were restricted during the 
first five years of the Bracero program: "Despite sporadic and sometimes serious 
mistreatment on American farms, this five-year period was one of the few times in 
the history of guestworker programs when foreign workers were treated somewhat 
like guests." However, the abuses grew worse in later years. See Hahamovitch, 
"Creating Perfect Immigrants," p. 82. 
52. As Vernon Briggs points out, an enforcement mechanism that relies on 
guestworker complaints to detect abuse will be ineffective because guestworkers 
often remain silent in order to avoid employer retaliation. See Briggs, "Nonimmigrant 
Labor Policy," p. 115. See also Michael Holley, "Disadvantaged by Design: How the 
Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers from Enforcing Their Rights," Hofstra Labor 
Law Journal 18 (2001): 575-623. 
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The best way to ensure that the level of exploitation is only 
modest, not severe, is to insist that wages for domestic and foreign 
workers be identical and not so low as to undercut the standard 
of living of native unskilled labor. The Gastarbeiter program is the 
model which other host nations should imitate. There should be 
equal pay for equal work, regardless of citizenship, and the pay 
ought to approach a living wage in the host country. With remu 
neration set at that level, and the rules conscientiously enforced, 
exploitation will be minimized or perhaps even abolished. 
But there is a second condition that must be met before a host 
government may dirty its hands. When faced with several feasible 
policy options, it should choose the one that reduces deprivation 
the most. Sometimes this is the dirty-hands option. 
There are two basic ways to avoid exploiting guestworkers and 
thus to keep our hands clean. The first is to increase the level of legal 
immigration into the country, setting all who enter the domestic 
labor force on the path to naturalization. Because the newcomers 
are not guests, they do not experience guestworker exploitation. The 
alternative clean-hands policy is to keep the newcomers out, so that 
they are neither guests nor (legal or illegal) immigrants. Because 
exploitation is an injustice of exchanges, if we refuse to exchange 
with these outsiders, we cannot exploit them. The second option, 
then, is to reduce immigration. 
These clean-hands alternatives are not equally feasible in the 
United States and other nations today, and they impact the disadvan 
taged in very different ways. Increasing immigration beyond current 
levels will reduce the deprivation of the most disadvantaged, who 
live abroad, but that policy is opposed by both political parties and 
a large majority of the electorate. Keeping outsiders out is the more 
popular alternative today, but it increases deprivation for the most 
disadvantaged.53 If we insist on clean hands, then, the option most 
likely to be chosen is the one that worsens the plight of would-be 
guests. When this is so, I hold that it is preferable to import guest 
workers, even when the program is (modestly) exploitative, because 
this dirty-hands option will reduce deprivation for those who are 
more disadvantaged than the clean-hands policy of exclusion. 
An underlying assumption of this argument is a qualified cos 
mopolitan principle that requires national communities to weigh 
53. On the benefit of increased immigration for the world's poor see Howard 
Chang, "Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the 
Optimal Immigration Policy, 
" 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 145 (1997): 
1147-1244. 
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the impact of immigration policies on outsiders.54 This principle 
does not demand that we dismantle national borders or redistribute 
resources on a global scale. But it does prohibit communities from 
choosing policies that increase deprivation abroad in order to benefit 
those at home who start with more. Regardless of their citizenship 
status, the disadvantaged have some claims against those who enjoy 
sufficiency. Relieving their deprivation should be prioritized. 
Opponents of guestworker programs frequently have a different 
priority. They focus on the plight of domestic unskilled labor, which 
may be worsened by guestworker programs.55 Many economists 
agree that the gains from increased immigration are not evenly dis 
tributed: while businesses and consumers benefit from an influx of 
cheap labor, some unskilled workers will face increased competition. 
The group most likely to lose is the previous wave of immigrants, 
who still do unskilled work.56 They pay disproportionately for the 
benefits of increased immigration. Taxpayers may pay a cost, too, if 
unskilled immigrants bring their families and settle down. The cost 
of government benefits for these families may exceed their contri 
bution to the economy.57 An influx of cheap labor may also retard 
technological innovation in the industries that rely on guestworkers, 
54. For a strong version of the cosmopolitan assumption in liberal egalitarian 
theory see Joseph Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders/7 Review 
of Politics 49 (1987): 251-75. For a more moderate version, which I endorse, see 
Howard Chang, "Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility: Guestworker Programs 
as Second-Best Policies/' North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 27 (2002): 465-81. 
55. For excellent criticisms of the guestworker concept that emphasize the cost 
to domestic unskilled labor see Philip Martin and Michael Teitelbaum, "The Mirage 
of Mexican Guest Workers," Foreign Affairs 80/6 (2001): 117-31; and U.S. Commission 
on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy 
(Washington, D.C: USCIR, 1997), pp. 109-110. 
56. On the impact of guestworker programs on domestic unskilled labor see 
Barry Chiswick, "The Impact of Immigration on the Level and Distribution of 
Economic Well-Being," in The Gateway: U.S. Immigration Issues and Policies, ed. Barry 
Chiswick (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 310; Julian Simon, 
The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1999), pp. 242,266; Peter Stalker, Workers without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization 
on International Migration (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 87; and 
Howard Chang, "Economic Analysis of Immigration Law," in Migration Theory: 
Talking across Disciplines, ed. Caroline Brettell and James Hollifield (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 210. 
57. On the cost to taxpayers if unskilled immigrants are quickly naturalized 
see Chang, "Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility," pp. 466-467; Chang, "Economic 
Analysis of Immigration Law," p. 215; Chiswick, "The Impact of Immigration on 
the Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being," p. 310; and Stephen Kershnar, 
"Immigrants and Welfare," Public Affairs Quarterly 16/1 (2002): 39-61. 
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and consumers will pay for this in the long run. Domestically, the 
biggest beneficiaries of these programs are the employers who hire 
guestworkers and profit from their labor. And these employers, of 
course, hardly count as disadvantaged. 
But to reject guestworker programs on these grounds discounts 
the plight of would-be guests, who are typically worse off than do 
mestic unskilled workers. Like host employers and consumers, the 
guests will benefit if they are admitted, and their benefit should be 
prioritized. Even if the program is modestly exploitative, that option 
is preferable to the clean-hands policy of exclusion, which avoids 
the taint of exploitation but leaves the would-be guests worse off 
than if they are admitted. 
As Cindy Hahamovitch observes, guestworker programs histori 
cally are the product of "an uncomfortable marriage between those 
who desired and those who resented foreign workers."58 If foreign 
workers are admitted as guests, neither camp gets its preferred 
option, but both also avoid their worst outcome. To be sure, the com 
promise has frequently resulted in the exploitation of foreign labor. 
But as long as the exploitation is not severe, that option is preferable 
to exclusion. Hahamovitch notes that sometimes the guestworker 
option has "staved off ... more draconian immigration restrictions 
by promising that state power could be employed to make immi 
gration temporary." Draconian immigration restrictions constitute 
a 
nonexploitative option, and when that is the likely alternative to 
a guestworker program, modest exploitation is the lesser evil.59 
Conclusion 
Given America's past record, there is good reason to fear that a 
new guestworker program will result in exploitation. Host employ 
ers and consumers may well gain at the expense of their guests, 
but not for the reasons identified by egalitarian and neoclassical 
exploitation theory. The root cause of exploitation is insufficiency, 
which motivates the disadvantaged to accept less than one who 
58. Hahamovitch, "Creating Perfect Immigrants," p. 78. 
59. Ibid., p. 76. Indeed, those with a cosmopolitan sensibility should be especially 
receptive to guestworker programs when they cannot enact their preferred policy of 
increased immigration. This is because temporary guests often become permanent 
residents. Once admitted, it is difficult for democratic states to expel these workers. 
Guestworkers, then, are often backdoor immigrants and future citizens or their 
legal equivalent. As the advocates of exclusion have come to recognize, "there is 
nothing more permanent than temporary workers." See Martin and Teitelbaum, 
"The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers," p. 131. 
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has enough would settle for. If this is correct, we might expect 
the next wave of American guestworkers to earn less than the just 
price for their labor. They will not be paid a sufficiency wage. And 
if Bracero-like abuses are tolerated, the exploitation will be unac 
ceptably severe. 
But if the pay is decent and the abuses are minimized, the exploi 
tation may only be modest. Modest exploitation is still unfair, but 
given the feasible alternatives it may be the best policy choice if we 
prioritize the interests of those who are badly off. When the public 
prefers restricting immigration, it blocks exploitation at home but 
increases deprivation abroad. The clean hands worsen the plight 
of those who are especially vulnerable. When that prospect looms, 
tolerating exploitation is preferable as long as it is restricted. True, 
this exploitation is wrong. But washing our hands of those who 
begin without enough is the greater injustice, because the refusal 
to 
exchange is sometimes worse than taking advantage. 
This argument justifies an injustice?the injustice of exploita 
tion. Exploitation is a problem of commutative justice, which is 
concerned with bilateral transactions between agents who are 
formally equal. I am arguing that sometimes it is right to tolerate 
wrong in these transactions; some exploiters should be allowed to 
take unfair advantage of those who are vulnerable. The justifica 
tion may seem to be consequentialist, focusing on benefits rather 
than justice, but the appearance is deceptive. I am not saying, with 
Machiavelli, that if the act accuses, the result excuses. Rather, I am 
arguing that exploitation is in certain cases a lesser wrong than 
another commutative injustice?the refusal to exchange?and it 
is more consistent with a higher principle of distributive justice, 
giving priority to those who start without enough. Consequences, 
then, do not trump justice in this argument. Rather, some principles 
of justice are given priority over others and lesser injustices are 
preferred to greater ones when perfect justice is not feasible. It is 
wrong to exploit, but it is worse to neglect if this increases depriva 
tion for the disadvantaged party. 
This is not the type of justification for guestworker programs 
which the Bush administration would welcome. It does not acknowl 
edge the dirty-hands dilemma or the exploitation its admission 
policy will likely facilitate. But the opponents of guestworker 
exploitation are sometimes even more blind. They see the wrong 
of exploitation but not the greater evil of deprivation, which guest 
worker programs may reduce. Their hands are not really clean but 
just soiled in a different way. The truly clean hands option is to ex 
pand immigration, guarantee a living wage to all, and redistribute 
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resources across borders in a more equitable fashion. But hardly 
anyone favors that option, and it would be wrong to impose it 
against the will of the majority. So policy in this arena must settle 
for a principle of minimizing dirt. A decent guestworker program 
best matches that principle. 
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